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Kiss and Tell: Making the Case
for the Tortious Transmission
of Herpes and Human Papillomavirus
Deuschle v. Jobe'
I. INTRODUCTION
Recognizing theories of recovery for a tort committed an estimated six
million times per year in the United States alone at anannual cost in excess of $4
billion is logical-if not imperative. Not all jurisdictions, however, recognize
theories of recovery when the tort in question is the wrongful transmission of
herpes and human papillomavirus ("HPV"), two of the most common, incurable
sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs") in America? Nevertheless, inDeuschle
v. Jobe the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouritook
a significant step by acknowledging an unmarried sexual partner's right to bring
negligence and intentional tort claims for the transmission of these STDs.5
Contending that wrongful transmission causes of action sounding in
negligence and intentional tort should be recognized, this Note begins by setting
forth the facts and holding of Deuschle, and thenprovides an overview of genital
herpes and HPV. Nex this Note surveys the legal landscape of tortious
transmission cases involving these two STDs and examines thepubliepolicies that
factor into the decision whether to allow tortious transmission actions. After
exploring Deuschle in detail, this Note seeks to uncover the roadblocks to
recovery that exist even when causes of action are recognized.
II. FACTS AND HoLDING
In 1998, Monica Deuschle and Jason Lee Jobe engaged in an intimate
relationship.6 Shortlythereafter, Ms. Deuschle was diagnosed withgenital warts
and herpes.7 As a result of these infections, she filed suit against Mr. Jobe in
Boone County Circuit Court.'
1. 30 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
2. See infra notes 61, 67, and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 29-77 and accompanying text
4. 30 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. Ct App. 2000).
5. Id. at 218-19.
6. Id. at216.
7. Id. For information regarding the nature and transmission of herpes and genital
warts, see infra notes 29-77 and accompanying text
8. Deuschle, 30 S.W.3d at 216.
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In her complaint, Ms. Deuschle alleged that her paramour knew of his
condition and of the likelihood of infecting others through unprotected sex.9 Ms.
Deuschle claimed, however, that he intentionally failed to inform her of his
condition and neglected to take any special precautions to prevent infection while
engaging in sexual relations with her." Ms. Deuschle claimed that, due to Mr.
Jobe's omissions, she was infected with both herpes and genital warts." Ms.
Deusehle further asserted that, because of these incurable viral infections, she
suffered and continues to suffer a plethora of damages, such as: "significant
physical pain"; "significant medical expenses ... , including physician fees,
psychological and therapy fees, [and] medication costs"; "severe psychological
and emotional trauma"; an increased risk of cervical cancer; the inability to "have
a normal sexual relationship"; and complications associated with future
pregnancies. 2 In all, Ms. Deuschle requested actual damages for "past, present,
and future medical and health-related expenses," as well as compensation for
"physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering," and punitive damages. 3
In response to Ms. Deuschle's complaint for tortious infection with herpes
and genital warts, Mr. Jobe filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 4 The
trial court sustained Mr. Jobe's motion, thereby dismissing Ms. Deusclde's
petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.15
On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of
Missouri, Ms. Deuschle argued that "infection of a sexually transmitted disease
is a recognized cause of action in Missouri" and, in the alternative, that the court
should "recognize such a claim if one does not currently exist." 6 Ms. Deuschle's
appeal set forth the requisite elements of this cause of action as: (1) knowledge
of infection with an incurable and "contagious sexually transmitted disease"; (2)
awareness of the likelihood of infecting an intimate partner when no precautions
are taken during sexual contact; (3) failure to disclose the infection to an intimate
partner or failure to take "any precautionary measures"; and (4) the resulting
infection of such partner with the disease."
After reciting the standard of review for a dismissal based on judgment on
the pleadings, the court noted that the cause of action invoked by Ms. Deuschle
9. Id.
10. Plaintiff's Petition paras. 4-5, at 1, Deuschle (No. WD 58074).
11. Deuschle, 30 S.W.3d at 216.
12. Id. at 216-17.
13. Id. at 217.
14. Id. at 216; see also Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
Deuschle (No. WD 58074).
15. Deuschle, 30 S.W.3d at 216, 217.
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had no statutory basis but that "Missouri common law has recognized a cause of
action for negligently transmitting herpes" since 1986.18 Inthese cases, however,
the parties were married.' Nevertheless, the court held that there was "no
justification for excluding an unmarried individual from bringing suit against her
sexual partner for transmitting herpes under general tort law" due to the trust
inherent in such intimate relationships.'
Specifically, with regard to Ms. Deuschle's claim of negligence, the court
found a duty based on the nature of sexual relationships and the public health
policy ofpreventing the spread of communicable diseases-such as herpes, which
is incurable.2' As a result, the court held "that one has a legal duty to exercise
reasonable care by disclosing a contagious venereal disease before entering into
sexual relations with another" and that"[i]n an action fornegligenttransmission
of a venereal disease, a person is liable if he Imew or should have kmown that he
was infected with a disease and failed to disclose orwamhis sexualpartner about
this unreasonable risk of harm before engaging in a sexual relationship." 3
The court next turned its attention to foreseeability and established the
requisite standard as "'whether or not a reasonably prudent person would have
anticipated danger and provided against it" The court concluded that the
foreseeability of infecting others with an STD exists when the actor is aware or
should be aware that he or she has the condition.
Having recognized a cause of action for negligence, identified a duty to
inform, and established a standard for foreseeability, the court found the
allegations regarding causation and damages inMs. Deuschle's petition sufficient
to withstand a motionto dismiss. 6 Furthermore, the court noted that intentional
tort claims for the transmission of an STD are also recognized in Missouri and
that the petition appears to involve such a claim?2' As a result, the court not only
remanded the case to the trial court with a direction that the dismissal for failure
to state a claim be reversed on the negligence cause of action, but it also required
18. Id.
19. Id. at217-18.
20. Id. at 218.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 218-19.
23. Id. at219.
24. Id. (quoting Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, InciSpecial PRmds.,






Mekel: Mekel: Kiss and Tell:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
that Ms. Deuschle be allowed to amend her petition to include an intentional tort
cause of action?
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part will explore: (1) the nature, transmission, occurrence, and
prevention of herpes and HPV; (2) the common law tort actions that have been
recognized in actions for the negligent and intentional transmission of these two
STDs; and (3) public policies behind wrongful transmission claims.
A. An Overview of Herpes and Human Papillomavirus
1. Herpes
A derivative of "herpein," a Greek word meaning "to creep," herpes is a
viral infctionthathas two forms-Type 1, which usuallymanifests itself as fever
blisters or cold sores on the face around the mouth, and Type 2, which generally
produces painful, blistered lesions in the genital region and initially includes flu-
like symptoms."0 Both forms of the virus are life-long infections, and those
infected often experience aprimaryepisode and subsequentrecurrences.3 ' During
periods of latency, "the virus retreats to the sacral ganglia, situated near the tail
of the spinal cord," where it remains for the life of the infected individual. 2
28. Id. at 219-20.
29. THE AmERICANHERrAGE DIcTIoNARY 608 (2d College ed. 1985).
30. Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Genital
Herpes, at http://www.niaid.nihgov/factsheets/stdherp.htm (last modified Mar. 2001).
However, it is not uncommon for someone infected with genital herpes to remain
asymptomatic. Id. "Up to [sixty percent] of people who have genital [herpes] infection
show no signs of the disease and are unaware that they are infected." Int'l Herpes
Alliance, GenitalHerpes: The Facts, athttp://www.herpesalliance.org/resourcesO3.asp
(last visited Oct 31, 2001).
31. Int'l Herpes Alliance, Genital Herpes: The Facts, at
http://www.herpesalliance.org/resoures03.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
"Approximately [eighty percent] of persons having a first episode caused by [genital
herpes] will have at least one recurrence.... The most common scenario is occasional
recurrences (about [four] attacks per year). However, a minority will [suffer more]
recurrences." Id. "[I]nmost cases[,] outbreaks become fewer and weaker over the course
ofa fewyears. They usually end within five or sixyears." Planned Parenthood, Herpes:
Questions &Answers, athttp://www.plannedparenthood.org/sti-safesex/herpes.htm (last
modified Sept 2000).
32. Int'l Herpes Alliance, Genital Herpes: The Facts, at
http://www.herpesaliane.org/resources03.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
[Vol. 66
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Type 2, commonly referred to as genital herpes, is typically transmitted
through sexual activity in which the uninfected partner contacts open lesions on
the infected partner's body.3 The virus then enters the uninfected partner's body
through mucous membranes, usually in the genital area, or through abrasions in
the skin.' It is also possible to contract genital herpes through intercourse with
an infected, asymptomatic partner.3" Once infected with the virus, symptoms
associated with the primary episode may "appear within two to [ten] days" and
"last two to three weeks."3 6 Subsequent episodes, known as recurrences or
outbreaks, tend to be milder than the initial occurrence."' "The frequency and
severity of the recurrent episodes vary greatly. While somepeople have only one
or two outbreaks in a lifetime, others may have several outbreaks a year."
Often, outbreaks are "preceded by warning symptoms (also known as prodromal
symptoms) such as tingling, itching, burning or pain."*9
Diagnosing herpes can be difficult because of the general and varied
symptoms among those infected. As a result, "[a]ccurate diagnosis of genital
herpes is made most easily and correctly at the time of an active herpes infection,
preferably the initial symptomatic infection," and affirmative diagnosis involves
the testing of the fluid present in the blister-like lesions." Blood tests also may
beusedto detect the presence of herpes virus antibodies; however, while positive
results of such tests increase the likelihood of genital herpes infection, the testing
of the fluid from lesions is the definitive test." Once diagnosed with genital
33. Planned Parenthood, Herpes: Questions & Answers, at
http:/Aww.plannedparenthoodorg/sti-safesex/herpes.htm (last modified Sept 2000).
34. Id.
35. Int'l Herpes Alliance, Genital Herpes: The Facts, at
http://wwwlierpesalliance.org/resourcesO3.asp (Iastvisited Oct. 31,2001). "Upto [sixty
percent] of people who have genital [herpes] infection show no signs of the disease and
are unaware that they are infected. These people are, however, capable of transmitting
the virus to others." Id.
36. Nat'l Inst of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Genital
Herpes, athttp://wwwmiaid.nihagov/factsheets/stdherp.hitm astmodified Mar. 2001).
37. Id.
38. Id. Triggers of recurrences may include "[o]ther infections, stress, surgery,
-mensiruation, sexualintercourse, and skinirritations like sunbum." PlannedParenthood,
Herpes: Questions & Answers, at httpJAvww.plannedparenthood.org/sti-
safesextaerpes-ltm 0astmodified Sept 2000);see alsoNat'l Inst ofAllergy& Infectious
Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Genital Herpes, at
http://wwwmiaid.nikgov/factsheets/stdherp.htm (last modified Mar. 2001).
39. Int'l Herpes Alliance, Genital Herpes. The Facts, at
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herpes, treatment options range from home remedies42 that soothe symptoms to
prescription regimens43 that speed recovery during outbreaks andretard additional
outbreaks." Nevertheless, these treatments are merely methods of managing the
disease because no cure exists.45
In additionto the physical symptoms directly resulting from infection withthe
herpes virus, there are numerous other problems associated with the disease.
First, victims often experience shock and depression.46 Second, herpes can
increase the risk of human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") infection because of
the open lesions that develop during outbreaks; if both are present, herpes and
HIV can interact adversely, aggravating both conditions.4' Third, for pregnant
women, herpes presents two uncommon-but-dangerous risks to the fetus: (1)
miscarriage, if the primary episode of genital herpes occurs during the first
trimester; and (2) infection of the baby during birth ifthe mother is suffering from
the primary outbreak at the time and delivers vaginally.48 This second risk, known
as neonatal herpes, "can cause skin, eye or mouthinfections, damage to the central
nervous system and other internal organs, mental retardation, or death.""
42. Such remedies include: taking warm baths, applying wet tea bags to the
irritated area, washing the area with salt water, taking over-the-counter pain relievers,
using corn starch to dry the area, and wearing loose clothes. See id.; Planned Parenthood,
Herpes: Questions & Answers, at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/sti-
safesex/herpes.htm (last modified Sept 2000).
43. Treatment of an outbreak with prescriptions for the purpose of shortening it is
known as episodic treatment, whereas ongoing use of pharmaceuticals to curtail
outbreaks is known as suppressive therapy. Int'l Herpes Alliance, GenitalHerpes: The
Facts, at http://www.herpesalliance.org/resources03.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
Prescriptions used for both purposes are antiviral medications that halt the virus's
reproduction, and they include acyclovir, famciclovir, and valacyclovir. See id.; Planned
Parenthood, Herpes: Questions &Answers, at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/sti-
safesex/herpes.htm (last modified Sept 2000).
44. Planned Parenthood, Herpes: Questions & Answers, at
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/sti-safesex/herpes.htm (last modified Sept 2000).
45. Id.
46. John Leo, The New Scarlet Letter, TIME, Aug. 2, 1982, at 64; see also Nat'l
Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Genital Herpes, at
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/stherp.htm (last modified Mar. 2001).
47. Lawrence Corey & RI Hunter Handsfeld, GenitalHerpes and Public Health:
Addressing a Global Problem, 283 JAMA 791,793 (2000).
48. Int'l Herpes Alliance, Genital Herpes: The Facts, at
http://www.herpesalliance.org/resources03.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
49. Int'l Herpes Alliance, Genital Herpes: Herpes Simplex and Pregnancy, at
http://wwwJhepesalliance.org/resources04.asp (lastvisited Oct. 31,2001); see also Nat'l
Inst of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l lists. of Health, Genital Herpes, at
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/stdherp.htm (last modified Mar. 2001).
[Vol. 66
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Herpes has been a blight on mankind "for at least 2,000 years. It is said to
have caused so terrible an epidemic of lip sores in ancient Rome that the Emperor
Tiberius bannedkissing."'5 Itwas so prevalent among eighteenth-century French
prostitutes thatitwas recognized as "'a vocational disease of women."' 5 ' Today,
genital herpes is among the top five most common STDs in the United States 2
with an estimated prevalence s of between forty-five milhon and sixtymillionel
and an estimatedincidence ofbetweenfive-hundredthousand"' and onemillion.'
The rate of new infections is highest among teenagers and those in their early
twenties, and the infection rate of adolescents and young adults recently has been
rising. 9 Otherwiselherpes appears to be an equal-opportunity disease-crossing
all socioeconomic, racial, ethnic, and geographical boundaries.' The severity of
the problem goes beyond the pain and suffering of the afflicted; in 1994, the total
cost of herpes was estimated at $237 million.61
50. Leo, supra note 46, at 62.
51. Leo, supranote 46, at 62; see also 43 AhL JUL. Trials § 2 (1991).
52. CENTERs FOR DiSEASE CONTROL & PREVNTON, TRACKING TnE HIMDEN
EPIDMICS: TRENDS IN STDs IN THE UNrrED STATES 2000, at 2 (2000) [hereinafler
HIDDENEPIDEMICS].
53. Prevalance refers to the number of persons infected with a disease at a ginen
time. Id.
54. Id. Approximately "one in five people in the United States over age [twelve]
... are infected with... genital herpes." Nat'l Inst of Allergy & Infectious Diseases,
Nat'l Insts. of Healtb, SYD Statistics, athttp:/Awwnid gov/factshwstdstatshtm
(last modified Dec. 1998). Furthermore, genital herpes "is more common in women
(approximately one out of four women) than in men (almost one out of five). This may
be due to male-to-female transmission being more efficient than female-to-male
transmission." Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'1 Ctr. for lIIV, ST) & TB
Prevention, Div. of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, Genital Herpes, at
httpJ/www.cdo.gov/nchstp/dstd/factsheets/Factsgenitalherpes.Mm CastmodifiedJune
2001).
55. Nat'l Inst of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, An
Introduction to Sexually Transmitted Diseases, at
http:lwww.niaidmaih.gov/factsheetslstdinfo.htm (last modified July 1999).
56. Incidence refers to the number of newly diagnosed cases of a condition on an
annual basis. HDDEN EPmEcs, supra note 52, at 2.
57. Nat'l Inst of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Ists. of Health, An
Introduction to Sexually Transmitted Diseases, at
http:/Awwiaid.nih.gov/factsheets/stdinfohtm (last modified July 1999).
58. HIDDENEPmE1CS, supra note 52, at 2.
59. HIDDENEPIDM CS, supra note 52, at 20.
60. HMiDENEPiDMcs, supra note 52, at 20.
61. HIDDENEPIDEMICS, supra note 52, at 5. These costs include expenditures for
medical services and supplies, as well as lost wages due to illness. HDDENEPIDEMICS,
2001]
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Although the physical, emotional, and financial costs of herpes cannot be
eradicated because there is no cure, these costs can be protracted through the
prevention of further infection. The simplest forms of prevention are abstinence
by infected persons during prodrome and outbreaks, and the use of latex condoms
between recurrences.62 Nevertheless, these precautions may not be fail proof
because viral shedding may occur when no symptoms are present, and herpes can
be transmitted through contact with areas not shielded by condoms.63 Currently,
additional preventive measures are in the pipeline-including an experimental
vaccine that "has proven [seventy-three percent] to [seventy-four percent]
effective in preventing genital herpes in women who were considered at high risk
forthe infection."' However, until suchmeasures are proven effective and widely
disseminated, reliance on those infected to abstain from sex, warn partners, and
use condoms is the primary defense against the escalation of herpes infection and
its associated costs.
2. Human Papillomavirus
HPV also ranks among the top five STDs in the United States with an
estimated prevalence of twenty million65 and an estimated incidence of 5.5
million.' In 1994, the estimated annual cost of HPV in the United States
exceeded $3.8 billion.67 Like herpes, HPVis "widespread across racial and ethnic
supra note 52, at 5.
62. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for HIV, STD & TB




64. L. Bell, Vaccine Helps Thwart Herpes in Women, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 18, 2000, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/special/hiv/newsline/cdc/091800g2.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
65. HIDDNEPi.DEMICS, supra note 52, at2. "HPVis likelythe most common STD
among young, sexually active people." HIDDEN EPIDEMICs, supra note 52, at 18. For a
definition of prevalence, see supra note 53.
66. HIDDEN EPIDEICS, supra note 52, at 18. "The rate of new infections for
herpes and HPV-both viral STDs-is typically highest during the late teens and early
twenties. Among women under the age of [twenty-five], studies have found that [twenty-
eight] to [forty-six] percent are typically infected with HPV." HIDDEN EPIDEMICS, supra
note 52, at 4. Moreover, "[a]n estimated [seventy-five] percent of the reproductive-age
population has beeninfectedwithsexuallytransmitted HPV." HIDDENEPIDEMICS,supra
note 52, at 18. For a definition of incidence, see supra note 56.
67. HIDDEN EPIDEMICS, supra note 52, at 5. These costs include medical services
and supplies, as well as lost wages due to illness. HIDDEN EPIDEMICS, supra note 52, at
[Vol. 66
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss4/7
TORTIOUS TRANSMISSION OF COMMON SI'DS
groups" and shows "very little regional variation." However, whereas there are
two types of the herpes virus, there are in excess of one hundred varieties of
HPV. 9 Of those varieties, fewer than half cause genital warts, also kmown as
venerealwarts and condylomata acuminata; thesewart-causing strains ofHPVare
"low-risk" versions of the virus because they do not lead to cervical or other
genital cancers, as do some of the non-wart-causing varieties of HPV!7 Both the
wart-causing and non-wart-causing types of HPV are spread through sexual
contact with infected persons; however, the wart-causing strains manifest
themselves through warts in the genital region that appear "within three months
of contact." 71
Although the warts can be removed, HPV cannot be cured, and the warts
often recur.' In addition, genital warts can complicate pregnancy because they
may "cause obstruction during delivery." Furthermore, "infants bom to women
5. However, the estimated $3.8 billion does not include the costs associated with HPV-
related cervical cancer. Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of
Health, STD Statistics, athttpYAwwianiLih.gov/factsheets/stdstats.htm (astmodified
Dec. 1998). If these costs are included, the total expenditures related to HPV in 1994
equaled approximately $4.5 billion. Id.
68. HIDDE, EPDzECS, supra note 52, at 4-5.
69. Nat'l Inst of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Human
Papillomavirus and Genital Warts, at http://www.niaid.nlh.gov/factsheets/stdhpvhtm
(last modified Mar. 2001).
70. H]DDENEPIDEMIC, supranote 52, at 18. Specifically, HPV types 16, 18, 31,
and 45 "accountfor [eighty] percent ofcervical cancers." HIDDENEPIDEMICSsupranote
52, at 18. "Worldwide, cervical cancer is the second most common cancer among
women." Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, STD
Statistics, athttp://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/stdstats.htm (last modified Dec. 1998).
71. Nat'l Inst of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l lasts. of Health, Human
Papillomavirus and Genital Warts, at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheetsLstdhpv.htm
(last modified Mar. 2001); see supranotes 69-70 and accompanying text. Warts occur
in"[a]bouttwo-thirds ofpeoplewho have sexual contact" Vwith aninfected partner. Nat'l
Inst ofAllergy& Infectious Diseases, Nat'lnsts. of Health, Human Papillomavirus and
Genital Warts, at http:/Avww.niaidnihtgov/factsheets/stdhpv.htm (last modified Mar.
2001). "Research indicates that approximately one percent of sexually active adults in
the United States [has] genital warts." HIDDEN EPIDEMICS, supra note 52, at 19.
72. Methods of removal include topical ointments, freezing, burning, laser
treatment, injection, and surgery. Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l
Insts. of Health, Human Papillomavirus and Genital Warts, at
http://www.niaidiih.gov/factsheets/stdhpv.htm (lastmodifiedMar. 2001). Thereis some
evidence that HPV can be eradicated by the immune system. HIDDENEPIDEMICssupra
note 52, at 18.
73. Nat'l Inst of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Human
Papillomavirus and Genital Warts, at http://ww.niaicLnih.gov/factsheetsstdhpvhtm
2001]
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with genital warts [may] develop warts in the throat (laryngeal papillomatosis ),"
a rare-but potentially life-threatening--condition. 4
As with other STDs, "[t]he only way... [to] prevent HPV infection is to
avoid direct contactwiththe virus."' Therefore, visible warts shouldbe removed,
and latex condoms should be used to "provide some protection.' n6 Presently,
development of a preventive vaccine is underway, but until such medical
interventions become available, the burden falls onthose with knowledge of their
infection to take adequate precautions.'
B. An Overview of Common Law Actions for
the Negligent and Intentional Transmission of Herpes and HPV
The common law actions by which a plaintiffbrings tortious transmission of
herpes and HPV claims are: negligence, misrepresentation and fraud, battery, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.78 This subsection explores these causes
of action in the context of wrongful transmission and examines the elements
required in Missouri to bring such claims successfully.
1. Negligence
Negligence is the most frequently asserted cause of action in cases for the
transmission of herpes or IPV. 9 The requisite elements of a prima facie case of





78. See 43 AU JUR. Trials § 5 (1991); Daniel C. Eidsmoe & Pamela K. Edwards,
Sex, Lies andInsurance Coverage? Insurance Carrier Coverage Defenses for Sexually
TransmittedDisease Claims, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 921,923 (1999); Louis A. Alexander,
Note, Liability in Tortfor the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the
Law, 70 CORNELLL. REv. 101, 102 (1984); David J. Mack, Note, Cleansing the System:
A FreshApproach to Liabilityfor the Negligent or Fraudulent Transmission ofSexually
Transmitted Diseases, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 650 (1999).
79. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 841 F. Supp. 444, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (alleging
negligence, fraud, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for the
transmission ofherpes, and upholding summary judgment in favor ofthe defendant based
on a conflict of laws issue); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 565 (Ct. App. 1990)
(alleging and recognizing negligent transmission of herpes); Kathleen K. v. Robert B.,
198 Cal. Rptr. 273,274 (Ct. App. 1984) (alleging and recognizing negligence, battery,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for the transmission of herpes);
Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350, 351-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (alleging and
[Vol. 66
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negligence are: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a
breach of the defendant's duty;, (3) causation; and (4) damages.' Furthermore,
Section 282 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts establishes the standard for
determining negligence as "conductwhichfalls belowthe standard established by
law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk ofharm"';1 and Section
4 ofthe Restatement defines duty as the requirement that one "conduct himself in
a particular manner at the risk that if he does not do so he becomes subject to
liability to another to whom the duty is owed for any injury... of which that
actor's conduct is a legal cause."'
recognizing negligence, battery, fraud, and intentional infliction ofemotional distress for
infection with genital warts); Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So. 2d 404, 404 (Fla. Dist Ct. App.
1991) (alleging negligence, battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
for infection withherpes, and recognizing only negligence); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d
852,853, 855 (Ga. Ct App. 1985) (alleging negligence, battery, andintentionalinfliction
ofemotional distress for the transmission ofherpes, and recognizing negligence); Meany
v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 230, 236 (La. 1994) (alleging and recognizing negligent
transmission ofherpes); McPhersonv. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043,1044-46 (Me. 1998)
(alleging negligence, assault and battery, andnegligentinflictionofemotional distress for
infectionwith-PV, andrecognizing negligence); B.N. v. KK., 538 A.2d 1175,1177-79
(Md. 1988) (alleging fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and
assault and battery in the transmission of herpes, and recognizing all but assault and
batterydueto the nnning ofthe statute of limitations); Ruonav. Ruona, No. C2-92-1575,
1993 WL4125, at *1 (Mlmn. Ct App. Jan. 12,1993) (alleging and recognizing negligent
transmission of herpes, but barring the action based on the running of the statute of
limitations); ILM.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645,646 (Min. Ct App. 1991) (alleging
negligent and intentional infection with herpes, and recognizing negligence); RA. v.
B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103,104 (Mlnn. Ct. App. 1988) (alleging negligent intentional, and
fraudulentinfectionwithherpes, and recognizing negligent and fraudulent transmission);
S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1986) (alleging and recognizing willful,
reckless, and negligent transmission of herpes); G.L. v. M.L., 550 A.2d 525, 526, 528
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988) (alleging and recognizing negligence andintentional tort
claims for the transmission of herpes); Maharam v. Mahararn, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105,
107 (App. Div. 1986) (alleging and recognizing fraudulent and negligent transmission
of herpes); Reinke v. Lenchitz, 537 N.E.2d 709,709-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (alleging
wanton or negligent transmission of herpes and recognizing negligence); Smith v.
Walker, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 663, 663-65 (1991) (alleging negligence, fraud, battery, and
intentionalinfliction ofemotional distress arising out ofthe transmission ofgenitalwarts,
and recognizing negligence, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
80. DANB. DOBBS, TnELANW OF TORTS § 114 (2000); see also 43 A. JuR. Trials
§ 6 (1991).
81. RESTAmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
82. RESTATzrENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965).
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Using these guidelines, numerous decisions that predate Deuschle have
significant language devoted to the duty element.' Many courts have based the
existence of such a duty between sexual partners on the foreseeability of
transmitting the disease.' Other courts have engaged in balancing various factors
to determine whether a duty exists.' In both lines of cases, courts have stressed
the defendant's actual or imputed knowledge of his or her STD infection. 6
83. See, e.g., Long, 333 S.E.2d at 854 (holding that "[t]he duty owed is the same
one that every individual in this state owes another: the duty to exercise ordinary care not
to injure others"); Meany, 639 So. 2d at 233-35 (holding that "[tihe duty of the infected
partner is either to abstain from sexual contact with others or to warn others of the
infection before sexual contact"); McPherson, 712 A.2d at 1045-46 (holding that "one
who knows or should know that he or she is infected with a sexually transmitted disease
is under a duty to protect sexual partners from infection"); B.N., 538 A.2d at 1178
(holding that "the infected person has a duty to take reasonable precautions-whether by
warning others or by avoiding contact with them-to avoid transmitting the disease');
MMD., 467 N.W.2d at 647 (holding that where a person should know of his or her
diseased condition, "the person has a duty to avoid sexual contact, or at least to inform
potential sexpartners"---constituting"a legal dutytowarn");R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 106-
08 (holding that "people suffering from genital herpes generally have a duty either to
avoid sexual contact with uninfected persons or, at least, to warn potential sex partners
that they have herpes before sexual contact occurs').
84. See, e.g., Doe, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 567 (stating that "only a slight degree of
foreseeability [is] needed to warrant the imposition of a duty of due care" in tortious
transmission cases); B.N., 538 A.2d at 1178 (stating that "[a]n important factor used to
determine the existence of a duty is foreseeability');M.M.D., 467 N.W.2d at 647 (stating
that "[a] key factor... in determining if a legal duty exists is whether the potential injury
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's actions"); R.A.P., 428
N.W.2d at 107-08 (stating that "ft]he foreseeability of potential injury is a key factor..
. in establishing the scope of the legal duty to use reasonable care"); see also 43 AM. JUR.
Trials § 7 (1991).
85. SeeMeany, 639 So. 2dat233 (citingthe relevant factors as the subsequent flow
of litigation, the nexus between the conduct and the harm, the economic impact, the
nature of the conduct, morality and the victim's culpability, precedent, and the evolution
of cultural norms).
86. See Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (requiring
a showing that "the defendant knew he or she was infected... [and] had been informed
that said disease could be communicated through sexual intercourse"); Meany, 639 So.
2d at 234 (stating that, "[i]f a defendant has experienced an attack or has sought medical
advice concerning such symptoms, he would likely be deemed... to possess the requisite
knowledge, whether or not an actual diagnosis could be proved");McPherson, 712 A.2d
at 1046 (noting that to be liable for negligent transmission, it must be proven that the
defendant knew he or she had the disease); B.N., 538 A2d at 1179 (stating that "[o]ne
who knows he or she has a highly infectious disease can readily foresee the danger that
the disease may be communicated to others with whom the infected person comes into
[Vol. 66
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss4/7
TORTIOUS TRANSMISSION OF COMMON STDS
Typically, these cases do not require the defendant's diagnosis with the STD;
rather, symptoms ormedical consultationfor symptoms usually suffices.' If such
knowledge exists or can be deemed to exist the duty owing from the infected
defendant to the plaintiff generally has been articulated as the duty to take
reasonable precautions to prevent infection-such as a duty to abstain or a duty
to warn 3
In Missouri, the requisite elements for a prima facie case of negligence
mirror the traditional requirements, and they include:
(1) [a] legal duty on the part of the defendant to conform to a certain
standard of conduct to protect others against unreasonable risks; (2) a
breach of that duty, (3) a proximate cause between the conduct and the
resulting injury; and (4) actual damages to the claimant's person or
property.s9
Moreover, Missouri recognizes that a duty may "arise out of a relationship
between the partiesL,] ... derived from a calculus of factors,' *O including:
the social consensus that the interest is worthy of protection; the
foreseeability of harm and the degree of certainty that the protected
person suffered injury, moral blame society attaches to the conduct; the
prevention offitureharm consideration of cost and abilityto spread the
contacf);MM.D., 467 N.W.2d at 647 (noting that, where a defendanthas symptoms and
has been told by a physician to be tested for the disease, a duty will be imputed); RAP.,
428 N.W.2d at 108 (stating that "[a] reasonable person should know that if he/she has a
contagious, sexually transmissible disease like genitalherpes, the disease is likely to be
communicated through sexual contact").
87. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
88. See Doe, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 568 (adopting the duty set forth in RAP., 428
N.W.2d at 108, infra); Gabriel, 576 So. 2d at 405 (establishing the defendant's duty as
"infonming the plaintiff of the presence of the disease and... securing the plaintiffs
consent to sexual intercourse under such circumstances"); Meany, 639 So. 2d at 235
(holding that "the duty of the infected party is either to abstain from sexual contact with
others or to warn others of the infection before sexual contact"); B.M, 538 A.2d at 1179
(holding that "the infected person has a duty to take reasonable precautions-whether by
warning others or by avoiding contact with them-to avoid transmitting the disease");,
RAP., 428 N.W.2d at 108 (holding that "people suffering from genital herpes generally
have a duty either to avoid sexual contact with uninfected persons or, at least, to warn
potential sex partners that they have herpes before sexual contact occurs"); see also 43
AM JuR. Trials § 7 (1991).
89. Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, IncJSpecial Prods., Inc., 700
S.W.2d426, 431 (Mo. 1985).
90. Id. at 432.
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risk of loss; [and] the economic burden upon the actor and the
community.91
Prior to Deuschle, the Missouri Supreme Court cleared the way for tortious
transmission claims.' Although almost entirely devoted to abrogating
"Missouri's longstanding rule of interspousal immunity for tort actions" that
sound in negligence, the basis of SA. V v. KG. V? was a wife's allegation that
her husband contracted, and "willfully, recklessly and negligently transmitted the
disease to [her] without informing her of his infection." 4 In S.A. V, the court
ordered reinstatement of the wife's petition based on the abrogation of
interspousal immunity and recognition of tortious transmission claims."
2. Misrepresentation and Fraud
Following negligence, the most common causes of action raised in tortious
transmission cases are misrepresentation and fraud." Although these causes of
91. Id.
92. See generally S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (abrogating
interspousal tort immunity and allowing a tortious transmission claim).
93. 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986).
94. Id. at 652.
95. Id. at 653.
96. See, e.g., Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339, 1340 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (discussing
tortious transmission of an STD, battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress arising from infectionwithherpes); Doev. Roe, 841 F. Supp. 444,445 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (alleging negligence, fraud, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and battery, and upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendant based
on a conflict of laws issue); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273,274 (Ct. App.
1984) (alleging and recognizing negligence, battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and fraud forthe transmission ofherpes); Hoganv. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350,351-
53 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1995) (alleging and recognizing negligence, battery, fraud, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress for transmission of genital warts); Gabriel v.
Tripp, 576 So. 2d 404, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (allegingnegligence, battery, fraud,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress for infection with herpes, and recognizing
only negligence); B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1176-77 (Md. 1988) (alleging fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and assault and battery, and
recognizing all but the assault and battery claim due to expiration of the statute of
limitations); RAP. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (alleging
negligent, intentional, and fraudulent infection with herpes, and recognizing all but the
intentional tort claims due to expiration of the statute of limitations); Maharam v.
Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105, 107 (App. Div. 1986) (alleging and recognizing
negligent and fraudulent infection with herpes); Smithv. Walker, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 663,
663-65 (1991) (alleging negligence, fraud, intentional infliction ofrneotional distress, and
[Vol. 66
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss4/7
TORTIOUS TRANSISSION OF COMMONSYDS
action commonly arise in the commercial context courts have been willing to
considerthemintortious transmission cases whenthefollowingrequisite elements
are established: "(1) an intentional misrepresentation (2) of fact or opinion...
(3) that is material and (4) intended to induce and (5) does induce reasonable
reliance by the plaintiff, (6) proximately causing pecuniary harm to the
plaintiffi" Nevertheless, courts specifically have focused on a plaintiff's ability
to show the defendant's knowledge of orbeliefinhis or her diseased condition,'
the defendant's representation of the absence of disease' or concealment of
disease by silence when there was a duty to speak,W and the defendant's intent to
induce the plaintiff's reliance." The damages and materiality elements have not
been pressed as the plaintiff's diagnosis with herpes or HPV following sexual
relations with the defendant is presumably sufficient"
battery based on infection with genital warts, and recognizing all but the battery claim
because neither party's brief addressed that cause of action).
97. See B.N., 538 A-2d at 1182; R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 108.
98. DOBBS, supra note 80, § 470; see also 43 Am JUR. Trials § 15 (1991).
99. See, e.g., B.N., 538 A.2d at 1183-84; RAP., 428 N.W.2d at 109;.Aaharam,
510 N.Y.S.2d at 106; see also 43 AM. JU,. Trials § 15 (1991).
100. See, e.g., Kathleen K, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77; see also 43 AM. JUR. Trials
§ 15 (1991).
101. See Kathleen YK, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77 (stating that "a certain amount of
trust and confidence exists in any intimate relationship, at least to the extent that one
sexualpartner represents to the other that he or she is free from vnereal... disease" and
that "consent to sexual intercourse [is] vitiated by one partner's fraudulent concealment
oftherisk ofinfectionwithvenereal disease"); B.N., 538 A.2d at 1182 (findingthatwhen
the defendant"conceal[s] the existence of genital herpes, ratherthanassertingthathewas
free of disease," it suffices for a representation where there is a duty to speak that arises
from either a confidential relationship or from a general tort duty); RAP., 428 N.W.2d
at 109 (holding that "failure to disclose a material fact may amount to a fraudulent
misrepresentation in cases where a party has a 'legal or equitable obligation' to
communicate the information to the other party" and that "people who know that they
have genital herpes have a legal duty to take reasonable care to prevent the disease from
spreading, and that this duty generally includes, at a minimum, the duty to inform
potential sex partners of the possibility of infection"); Maharain, 5 10 N.Y.S.2d at 107
(adopting the lower court's holding that a "thirty-one year marital relationship gave rise
to an affirmative 'legal duty to speak"'); see also 43 AM. JULr Trials § 15 (1991).
102. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564,568 (Ct. App. 1990); Kathleen K.,
198 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77; B.M., 538 A.2d at 1184; 43 AM. JUR. Trials § 15 (1991).
103. See Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that
"[wie can also dispose ofthelast element, recognizing that appellanthas suffered damage
bybeing afflictedwithanincurable disease!). Forthenature of herpes and HPV, see also
supra notes 29-77 and accompanying text
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Missouri's elements for misrepresentation generally follow the conventional
requirements, but they have been stated slightly differently by the Missouri
Supreme Court as:
a representation; its falsity; its materiality; the speaker's knowledge of
its falsity; his intent that it be acted on by the hearer and in the manner
reasonably contemplated; the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; his
reliance on its truth; his right to rely thereon; and his consequent and
proximate injury.'
In addition, Missouri courts recognize that fraud and misrepresentation do not
always require an affirmative representation."°  Silence may constitute fraud
when the silent party has a duty to speak, and such a duty arises when one party
has superior knowledge that is not reasonably available to the other party. " To
date, no appellate court in Missouri has decided a claim asserting
misrepresentation or fraud for the wrongful transmission of herpes or HPV.
104. John T. Brown, Inc. v. Weber Implement & Auto. Co., 260 S.W.2d 751,755
(Mo. 1953); see Mo. S. CT. COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MISSOURI APPROVED JURY
INsTRUCTIONs § 23.05 (Stephen H. Ringkamp & RichardE. McLeod eds., 5th ed. 1996).
105. Jones v. Arnold, 221 S.W.2d 187, 193 (Mo. 1949).
106. Id. In Jones, the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
While silence or concealment becomes fraudulent only where there is a duty
to speak and disclose, a legal duty to disclose may exist where there is no
existing fiduciary relationship between the parties and where no special
confidence is expressly reposed. The duty to disclose may arise from the
circumstances of the case, including inequality of condition and the superior
knowledge of one party, which knowledge is not within the fair and
reasonable reach of the other party.
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3. Battery
Another common cause of action brought in tortious transmission cases is
battery. 7 The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes battery in Section 18:
(1) An actor -is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with
the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or
indirectly results.103
In addition, Section 8A defines intent as the actor's "desires to cause
consequences ofhis act, orthathebelieves that the consequences are substantially
certain to result from it" 1" A leading authority establishes that "[t]he gist of..
. battery is that the plaintiff has been touched, intentionally, in a way that [he or]
she has not... consented to and that is notjustified by some generally recognized
privilege. The defendant's intent to touch in a way the plaintiff has not...
permitted is what counts." ' ° As a result, courts considering tortious transmission
107. See Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339, 1340 (11th Cir. 1997) (alleging and
recognizing tortious transmission of an STD, battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress arising from infectionwithherpes); Doev. Roe, 841 F. Supp. 444,445
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (alleging negligence, fraud, intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and battery, and upholding summary judgment in favor of the
defendant based on a conflict oflaws issue); Kathleen K, 198 Cal. Rptr. at274 (alleging
andrecognizingnegligence, battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
for the transmission of herpes); Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350, 351-53 (Fla. Dist Ct
App. 1995) (alleging andrecognizing negligence, battery, fraud, and intentionalinfliction
of emotional distress for the transmission of genital warts); Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So. 2d
404,404 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1991) (alleging negligence, battery, fraud, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress for infection with herpes, and recognizing only
negligence); Long, 333 S.E.2d at 853, 855 (allegingnegligence, battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress for the transmission of herpes, and recognizing only
negligence); McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1044-47 (Me. 1998) (alleging
and recognizing negligence, assault and battery, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress for transmission of HPV); B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1177 (Md. 1988)
(alleging fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and assault and
batteryinthe transmission ofherpes, and recognizing all butthe assault and battery claim
due to the running of the statute of limitations).
108. REsTATEmN'T (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965); see also DOBBS, supra note
80, § 28; 43 Am JUR. Trials § 13 (1991).
109. RESTATEmENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
110. DOBBS, supra note 80, § 29.
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actions brought under battery have not been willing to let defendants off the
hook-even if the sexual contact that led to the infection was consensual."' For
example, the Maine Supreme CourtinMcPherson v. McPherson,"' a suit brought
by a wife against her husband for tortious transmission, held, in part, that, in a
battery action, "[c]onsent may be vitiated . . . by misrepresentation." '
Nevertheless, itis still necessary to show that the defendant either desired to infect
the plaintiff or, at the least, that the defendant knew he or she had the disease,
which likely would be transmitted through sexual contact with the plaintiff'"4
Furthermore, the court in Hogan v. Tavzel,"5 a Florida case in which a woman
sued her ex-husband for battery because he allegedly infected her with genital
warts, stated that "consent to sexual intercourse is not the equivalent of consent
to be infected with a venereal disease."116
In Missouri, the elements of aprima facie case of battery reflect the contents
of the Restatement. These elements are set forth in the Missouri Approved Jury
Instructions as an intentional act by the defendant that results in "contact with
[the] plaintiffwhich [is] offensive to [the] plaintiff, and" that "such contact would
be offensive to a reasonable person." '117 To date, no appellate court in Missouri
has decided a wrongful transmission case for herpes or HPV sounding in battery.
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A fourth, and final, commonly pleaded cause of action in the tortious
transmission context is intentional infliction of emotional distress."' With regard
111. See McPherson, 712 A.2d at 1046; see also Kathleen K., 198 Cal. Rptr. at
276-77; Hogan, 660 So. 2d at 352-53; 43 AM. JUR. Trials § 13 (1991).
112. 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998).
113. Id. at 1046; see supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
114. McPherson, 712 A-2d at 1046.
115. 660 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
116. Id. at 352 (interpreting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B, illus. 5
(1977)).
117. MO. S. CT. COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MISSOURI APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 23.02 (StephenH. Ringkamp & Richard E. MoLeod eds., 5th ed. 1996).
118. See, e.g., Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339, 1340 (1lth Cir. 1997) (alleging
and recognizing tortious transmission of an STD, battery, fraud, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress arising from infection with herpes); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198
Cal. Rptr. 273, 274, 276-77 (Ct. App. 1984) (alleging and recognizing negligence,
battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for the transmission of
herpes); Hogan, 660 So. 2d at 351 (alleging and recognizing negligence, battery, fraud,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress for the transmission of genital warts);
Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So. 2d 404, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (alleging and
recognizing negligence, battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for
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to the criteria for such a claim, Section 46 oftheRestatement (Second) of Torts
states that "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such
bodilyharm."" 9 Under this cause of action, the Maryland Supreme Courtin.B.N.
v. KK"0 found that a "substantial certainty" or a 'high degree of probability"
that emotional distress would result from the defendant's acts was sufficient to
meetthe intent elementbecause"thetransmissionofgenitalherpes is substantially
certain to produce severe emotional distress [due to] the characteristics of the
illness."'' Furthermore, the B.N. court held that "[o]ne who knowingly engages
in conduct that is highly likely to infect another with an incurable disease... not
only engages in intentional or reckless conduct... [but] he or she [also] has
committed extreme and outrageous conduct"'
The Missouri Supreme Court initially recognized intentional infliction of
emotional distress as a cause of action in 1965, in part based on the language of
Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts." To date, one tortious
transmission case heard by a Missouri appellate court appears to have involved
intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 4 The plaintiff in that case, State ex
rel. M.D.K v. Dolan,' alleged that her husband was aware of his diseased
condition, that his failure to warn her was "outrageous," and that she incurred
the transmission of genital warts); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 853, 855 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1985) (alleging negligence, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
for the transmission offherpes, and recognizing only negligence); B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d
1175, 1176-77 (Md. 1988) (alleging fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligence, and assault and battery, and recognizing all but the assault and battery claim
due to the running ofthe statute of limitations); Smithy. Walker, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 663,
663-65 (1991) (alleging negligence, fraud, intentional infliction ofemotional distress, and
battery based on infection with genital warts, and recognizing all but the battery claim
because neither party's brief addressed that cause of action).
119. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also 43 AM. JUR. Trials
§ 17 (1991).
120. 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988).
121. Id. at 1180 (quoting Harris v. Jones, 380A.2d611, 614 (Md. 1977));see also
Leo, supra note 46, at 64.
122. B.N., 538 A.2d at 1180-81.
123. Pretsky v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 396 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Mo. 1965),
abrogated on other grounds by Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983)
(abrogating the impact rule and recognizing negligent infliction of emotional distress).
124. See State exrel M.D.K. v. Dolan, 968 S.W.2d 740,742 (Mo. Ct App. 1998).
125. 968 S.W.2d 740 (Mo. Ct App. 1998).
2001]
19
Mekel: Mekel: Kiss and Tell:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
"medical expenses, pain, severe emotional distress, embarrassment, and anguish"
as result of infection with an STD." 6
C. Public Policies
As with most torts, the rationales for recognizing wrongful transmission
claims include "redressing the violation of important norms, compensating
victims, and discouraging unsafe behavior."'" Considering the epidemic
proportions of herpes and HPV infection,' the rationale of "discouraging unsafe
behavior""' under the guise of public health has been a top priority for courts in
allowing these tortious transmission cases. 3 InR.A.P. v. B.J.P.,3' an action in
which a husband sued his wife for negligent and intentional transmission of
herpes, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that "Minnesota courts have long
recognized that the preservation of public health is a matter of great public
importance [and] [1]egal duties and rules must therefore be designed, whenever
possible, to help prevent the spread of dangerous, communicable diseases."1'
Echoing this sentiment the California Court of Appeals in Doe v. Roe,"' a case
in which a woman sued a former sexual partner for negligent transmission of
herpes, reasoned that "it is beyond question that our state's policy of preventing
the spread of venereal disease is great and that the burden of warning a
prospective sex partner is small." '34 Due to this staunch dedication to preserving
the public health, defendants who have claimed that privacy interests should be a
bar to disclosure and liability have failed. 35 The Doe court, following state
precedent on the issue, held that "[t]he incidental burden on [the] defendant in
forcing him to disclose details of his sex life is not sufficient to outweigh the
strong interest of the state in preventing the spread of communicable sexual
diseases. Consequently[,] we find no constitutional infirmityin thejudgment."' 36
126. Id. at 742.
127. Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
443, 455 (1987); see also 43 AM. JR. Trials § 1 (1991).
128. See supra notes 29-77 and accompanying text.
129. Abel, supra note 127, at 455.
130. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 567 (Ct. App. 1990); Meany v.
Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 234 (La. 1994); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988).
131. 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
132. Id. at 106.
133. 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Ct. App. 1990).
134. Id. at 567.
135. See id. at 568; Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Ct. App.
1984).
136. Doe, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 568; see also 43 AM. JUR. Trials § 22 (1991).
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The rationale of "compensating victims" I is obvious in herpes and HPV
cases where there is no cure, and where the emotional, physical, and economic
costs are staggering." As a result, courts have spent little time addressing this
justification.
The finalrationale, "redressingtheviolationofimportantnorms,"'1 appears
to be the lynchpin on which close cases turn. Although transmitting a venereal
disease violates societal norms, the situation from which the infection arises is
often out of step with socialvalues. As aresult, some courts have refused to allow
tortious transmission claims when the infection resulted from illegal or immoral
conduct, such as sex outside of marriage."' The Virginia Supreme Courtin Zysk
v. Zysk"' denied the claim because it arose out of intimate relations prior to the
parties' marriage in violation of the state's fornication statute." The Zysk court
stated that "Virginia follows the general rule that 'a party who consents to and
participates in an immoral or illegal act cannot recover damages from other
participants for the consequences of that act..'"
Onthe other hand, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Stopera v. DiMarco,'"
an action in which the transmission arose out of an adulterous affair, found "a
'culpability exception' to the wrongful-conduct rule where the plaintiff and the
defendant have both engaged in illegal conduct, but one is more culpable than the
other.""' 5 In making this finding, the Stopera court allowed the tortious
transmission action without "condon[ing] and farther encourag[ing]
illegality."" 6
137. Abel, supra note 127, at 455.
138. See supra notes 61, 67, and accompanying text.
139. Abel, supra note 127, at 455.
140. See Zyskv. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Va. 1990); see also Gabrielv. Tripp,
576 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1991) (stating that "if the defendant establishes
thattheplaintiffwas engaged in an illegal act atthe timehe or she contracted the disease,
this will bar anyrecovery"). But see Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852,855 (Ga. Ct. App.
1985) (allowing recovery in tort for injury resulting from violation of criminal statute);
Stoperav. DiMarco, 554N.W.2d379,381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing an exception
to the wrongful conduct rule where one party is more culpable of wrongdoing than the
other). See generally 43 AIM JUR. Trials § 20 (1991); Mack, supra note 78, at 656-58
(discussing the "wrongful-conduct doctrine" and its application in the tortious
transmission arena).
141. 404 S.E.2d 721 (Va. 1990).
142. Id. at 722.
143. Id. (quoting Miller v. Bennett, 56 S.E.2d 217, 218 (Va. 1949)).
144. 554 N.W.2d 379 (Mch. Ct. App. 1996).
145. Id. at 381.
146. Id.; see also Longv. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852,855 (Ga. C. App. 1985) (noting
that "[w]hile we do not here condone the sexual mores of our time, neither canwe ignore
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
After recapping the facts and procedural history that gave rise to the
Deuschle case, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of
Missouri first acknowledged the standard of review for a dismissal granted on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings.147 Under this standard, "a trial court
properly grants a motion for judgment onthe pleadings when the moving party can
show that on the face of the pleadings, it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. 1 4
Having recited the standard, the court moved on to the legal analysis to
determine ifthe standard had been met. In so doing, the court framed the issue in
light of Ms. Deuschle's contention on appeal that "Missouri recognizes a cause
of action for ... infection of a sexually transmitted disease."149 The court noted
that there was "no statutory basis for this cause of action" but found that, "since
1986, Missouri common law has recognized a cause of action for negligently
transmitting herpes."15° So holding, the court discussed the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision in S.A.V v. K G. V, 5 1 which first recognized wrongful
transmission claims sounding in negligence and intentional tort, and also
abrogated interspousal immunity in the negligence context. 52 Furthermore, the
court pointed to State ex rel. MD.K v. Dolan, decided by the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri, which stated in its review of S.A. V
that "'a wife can sue her husband for giving her herpes. "'153
The court next considered the applicability of these tortious transmission
actions involving spouses to the case atbar in which the parties were not married.
The court found "no justification for excluding an unmarried individual from
bringing suit against her sexual partner for transmitting herpes under general tort
law."' 5' To support this finding, the court quotedthe California Court of Appeals
the realities of present day life" and stating that "[i]t is well established that a person can
recover in tort for injury suffered as a result of his own criminal activity').




151. 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986). SA.V arose from a situation in which a wife
allegedly contracted herpes from her husband and sued him for "willfully, recklessly and
negligently transmitt[ing] the disease to [her] without informing her of his infection." Id.
at 652.
152. Deuschle, 30 S.W.3d at 218.
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decision in Kathleen K v. Robert B.,"s a tortious transmission case involving
unmarried partners, as holding that "'a certain amount of trust and confidence
exists in any intimate relationship, at least to the extent that one sexual partner
represents to the other that he or she is free from venereal or other dangerous
contagious disease."""s Accepting Kathleen Is holding, the court distinguished
SA. V by noting that the Missouri Supreme Court merely held thatmarriage was
neither a bar nor a prerequisite.' 7
After recognizing a cause of action for tortious transmission was available
to unmarried partners, the court recapped the four elements ofnegligence-duty,
breach, causation, and damages-and stated that "[d]uty is the only element of
negligence that is determined as a matter of law."'5u In contemplating the
imposition of a duty with regard to the transmission of incurable STDs, such as
herpes, the court declared a key policy rationale to be "the importance of
preserving public health and welfare by creating legal duties, which help prevent
the spread of dangerous, communicable diseases."'5' Based on this public policy,
the court held that "one has a legal duty to exercise reasonable care by disclosing
a contagious venereal disease before entering into sexual relations with
another."1" The court explicitly described the duty as follows: "In an actionfor
negligent transmission of a venereal disease, a person is liable if he knew or
should have known that he was infected with a disease and failed to disclose or
warn his sexual partner about this unreasonable risk of harm before engaging in
a sexual relationship."'
The court subsequently turned its attention to determining the foreseeability
of harm "[in] order to establish whether or not this duty ha[d] beenbreached."'16
Setting forththe generalralethat a"duty arises from circumstances inwhichthere
is a foreseeable likelihood that particular acts or omissions will cause harm or
injury,"'" the court examined STD transmission fromthe standpoint of "'whether
or not a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated danger and provided
againstit"" Becauseitfoundthat"herpes is almost exclusively spreadthrough
155. 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1984).
156. Deuschle, 30 S.W.3d at218 (quoingKathleenK, 198 Cal Rptr. at276-77).
157. Id. at 218.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 218-19.
161. Id. at219.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Gast v. Shel Oil Co., 819 S.W.2d 367, 376 (Mo. 1991) (en
band)).
164. Id. at 218 (quoting Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, InciSpecial
Prods., Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426,431 (Mo. 1985)).
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sexual contact," the court concluded that "it is foreseeable that one's sexual
partner is susceptible to the contagion if the infected partner is aware he [or she]
has the disease or suffers from [the] symptoms of the disease."'65 As a result, the
court adopted the reasoning ofBerner v. Caldwell,'" a tortious transmission case
decided by the Alabama Supreme Court, and held that "'[o]ne who knows, or
should know, that he or she is infected with genital herpes is under a duty to either
abstain from sexual contact with others or, at least, to warn others of the infection
prior to having contact with them. "16
Following its holdings (1) that Missouri recognizes an action for tortious
transmission, (2) that the action is available to unmarried parties, and (3) that
persons with herpes have a duty to abstain from sexual contact with others or to
warn others of the infection prior to such contact, the court found that Ms.
Deuschle alleged facts sufficient to make a prima facie showing."6 Furthermore,
the court noted that Ms. Deuschle's petition also appeared to invoke an intentional
tort theory of recovery but that it did not do so clearly; therefore, the court
"direct[ed] the trial court to allow her to amend the petition to allege a specific
intentional tort."'69 Finally, the court reversed the judgment of the lower court and
remanded the cause "to reinstate Ms. Deuschle's petition consistent with [the]
opinion. "170
V. COMMENT
In Deuschle, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of
Missouri cleared the way for unmarried sexual partners to bring actions in
negligence or intentional tort for the wrongful transmission of herpes and HPV.
While in line with the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed wrongful
transmission between unmarried partners, 171 this decision was somewhat
165. Id. at 218.
166. 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989), rev'don other grounds byExparte Gen. Motors
Corp., 769 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1999).
167. Deuschle, 30 S.W.3d at 219 (quoting Berner, 543 So. 2d at 689).
168. Id. at 218-19.
169. Id. at 219.
170. Id. at 219-20.
171. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Ct. App. 1990); Kathleen K. v.
Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct App. 1984); Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350 (Fla.
Dist Ct App. 1995); Longv. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); B.N. v. K.K.,
538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988); Stopera v. DiMarco, 554 N.W.2d 379 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996); M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Reinke v. Lenchitz,
537 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio Ct App. 1988); Smith v. Walker, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 663 (1991).
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surprising because Missouri is typically conservative on issues arising in the
bedroomn
However, despite this step bythe court thepath to recovery is still rife with
pitfalls for victims of this tort who seek redress through legal channels. The
potential bars to recovery that will be addressed in this Part include: (1)
establishing a duty based on the defendant's actual or implied knowledge of the
infection; (2) causation; (3) reluctance to bring an action due to discoveryinto and
introduction of the plaintiff's condition and sexual history; (4) statutes of
limitations; and (5) judgment-proof defendants.
The first hurdle in establishing a prima facie case for tortious transmission
is demonstrating a duty on the part of the infected defendant at least; to warn the
plaintiff of the existence of the disease prior to engaging in intimate relations."
The existence of such a duty hinges on what the defendant knew or should have
known with regard to his or her diseased condition at the time.'7
The most logical wayto prove knowledge, it would seem, is by obtaining the
defendant's medical records; however, "it may be difficult to prove the...
defendant actually had the disease because his or her medical records may be
172. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAr. § 1.205(l) (2000) (stating that"life... begins at
conception'); Mo. RFv. STAT. § 188.015(1) (2000) (defining abortion, in part, as "the
intentional destruction of the life of an embryo or fetus in his or her mother's womb");
Mo. REv. STrAT. § 188.028 (2000) (establishing the process bywhich a minormay obtain
an abortion); Mo. REv. STrAT. § 188.039.2(3) (2000) (requiring physicians to provide
women seeking abortions with information on the altematives to abortion prior to
obtaininginformed consentto performthe procedure); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.205 (2000)
(prohibitingthe use ofpublic funds intheperformance ot assistance in, orcounseling on
non-therapeutic abortions); Mo. REv. STrAT. § 188.215 (2000) (prohibiting the use of
public facilities in the performance ot assistance in, or counseling on non-therapeutic
abortions); Mo. REV. STAr. § 431.061.1(4)(a) (2000) (barring a minor from providing
consent on her own behalf to receive an abortion); Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2000)
(prohibiting marriage between same sexpartners); Websterv. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding Missouri laws barring the use of public facilities and funds
inthe provision ofnon-therapeutic abortions); Planned Parenthood Ass'n ofKansas City,
Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (affirming the constitutionality ofa Missouri
law requiring parental consent prior to allowing minors to obtain abortions); Planned
Parenthood of Cent Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down a Missouri law
that required wives to obtain their husband's consent prior to obtaining abortions). As
a result, it would not have been surprising for the Deuschle court to have followed the
Zysk opinion by the Virginia Supreme Court in holding there can be no recovery for
damages resulting from participation in an illegal or immoral act. For a discussion of
Zysk, see supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text
173. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 86, 99, and accompanying text.
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unobtainable."" 5 For example, the defendant may have used an alias in seeking
medical care-thereby, making the records undiscoverable. 176 Another problem
is a possible lack of medical records if the defendant never sought care for the
condition because he or she suffered no symptoms. This scenario easily could
arise because "[up] to [sixty percent] of people who have genital [herpes]...
show no signs of the disease and are unaware that they are infected[, although
they] ... are ... capable of transmitting the virus to others.""r In addition, HPV
often has no "visible signs and symptoms.""1 ' It is also possible that a
symptomatic defendant purposely did not seek care to avoid diagnosis.
Furthermore, even if care was sought, the condition may not have been diagnosed
accurately-especially herpes, which is notoriously difficult to diagnose."a 9
The next potential barrier is causation. Just because a plaintiff manifests
symptoms of herpes or HPV following sexual contact with the defendant does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the contact was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's infection. With regard to herpes, a plaintiff may have acquired the
disease previously but may not have experienced an outbreak until he or she was
re-exposed to the virus through contact with the defendant.' Moreover, for those
who are predisposed to outbreaks, there can be a two-week gap between exposure
and the primary occurrence.' Likewise, the wart-causing strains of HPV have
a three-month incubation period." As a result, the case could be vulnerable to
attack if the victim had prior or subsequent sexual partners."a
175. Scott Winokur, New Wave of Litigation Expands Women's Rights to the
Bedroom, SAN FRANcIScO EXAMINER, Jan. 28, 1996, available at
http://www.beflaw.com/newwave.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
176. Id.
177. Int'l Herpes Alliance, Genital Herpes: The Facts, at
http://www.herpesalliance.org/resourcesO3.app (last visited Oct. 31, 2001); see supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
178. Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Human
Papillomavirus and Genital Warts, at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/stdhpv.htm
(last modified Mar. 2001).
179. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
180. Planned Parenthood, Herpes: Questions & Answers, at
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/sti-safesex/herpes.htm (last modified Sept. 2000).
"Many people carry the virus... but do not have their first episode... until they are
infected another time." Id.
181. Int'l Herpes Alliance, Genital Herpes: The Facts, at
http:/Avww.herpesalliance.org/resources03.app (last visited Oct. 31, 2001); see supra
note 36 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
183. Winokur, supra note 175; see Kenneth C. Jones, Woman Can Sue Man Who
Gave Her Herpes, Mo. LAW. WKL, Nov. 6,2000, at 14; see also 43 AM. JuR. Trials §
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This causation quandaryputs avictin's sexualhistory atissue and highlights
the embarrassment inherent in making such a private problem public." This
sensitivity to making one's sexually-related medical condition public may be
exacerbated by the psychological "leper effect' and guilt experienced by herpes
victims due to the incurable nature of this socially-frowned-uponillness.'1 Even
if a plaintiff overcomes these emotional and social hurdles, a court may allow the
admission of potentially prejudicial evidence. In Judd v. Rodmanll the court
allowed into evidence the plaintiff's "prior sexual history, employment as a nude
dancer, and breast augmentation surgery."" On appeal, the court held that "this
evidence did not constitute reversible error."" The court specifically found, with
regard to the "evidence of [the plaintiff's] sexual history and nude dancing, [that]
this evidence was substantially more probative than prejudicial [under Federal
Rule of Evidence 412] and, therefore, [was] properly admitted at trial111c)
Another obstacle involves the running of the pertinent statutes of limitations.
This issue typically arises when an STD infection is unknown to a plaintiff for a
number ofyears9" orwhen aplaintiff simply does notbring the action in a timely
manner."9 In such instances, courts have not tolled statutes of limitations in
tortious transmission cases."w As a result, statutes of limitations may preclude
wrongful transmission claims from getting out of the gate. Missouri's relevant
statutes oflmitations are containedinMissouriRevised Statutes Section516.120,
which requires actions for personal injury to be brought within five years and
claims based on fraud to be brought within fifteen years of the action giving rise
to the clainm.
11(1991).
184. Winokur, supranote 175; see Jones, supra note 183, at 14.
185. Leo, supra note 46, at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Jones, supra
note 183, at 14; Wmokur, supra note 175.
186. 105 F.3d 1339 (lth Cir. 1997).
187. Id. at 1340.
188. Id. at 1343.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 30 and 35.
191. This reluctance mayberelated to the factthat theplaintiff and defendanthave
an ongoing relationship, such as an intact marriage.
192. See, e.g., Ruona v. Ruona, No. C2-9201575, 1993 WIL 4125, at *l-2 (Mvinn.
CL App. Jan. 2, 1993) (upholding the trial court's decision to "deny a motion to amend
pleadings when the proposed amendment would serve no legalpurpose" with regard to
reinstating a"time-barred tort claim'); RAP. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103,109 (Minn. CL
App. 1988) (refusingto create ajudicial exceptionto the statute of limitations becausethe
parties were married).
193. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120 (2000). Specifically with regard to fraud, Section
516.120(5) states: "Anaction forreliefonthe ground of fraud, the cause ofactionin such
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A final, case-breaking concern is a source of recovery. 94 Most commonly,
this source is a liability insurance policy. 95 However, since the advent oftortious
transmission cases inthemid-1980s, "[m]any [insurance] carriers quickly drafted
policy language excluding coverage for sexually transmitted diseases. 191 6 Even
in the absence of such an exclusion, there may be no coverage based on other
policy provisions, such as the intentional and criminal acts exclusions, which are
almost universally included in homeowners policies. " Intentional act exclusions
"explicitly limiti] coverage for intentionally caused losses" '198 and are supported
by public policy, which "forbids contracts indemnifying a person against loss
resulting from his or her own willful wrongdoing."" 9 Similarly, criminal act
exclusions serve the same purpose and may come into play in the wrongful
transmission context where a state has criminal statutes relating to the
transmission of STDs, fornication, or adultery.20 Using exclusionary policy
provisions, some insurers have been able to avoid indemnifying defendants for
case to be deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any
time within tenyears, of the facts constituting the fraud." Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120(5)
(2000). As a result, in the case of fraud, a party has ten years to discover the fraud and
an additional five years to bring an action.
194. Defendants may be judgment proof because they have no assets or liability
coverage, or because their actions have invalidated any such coverage. See Jones, supra
note 183, at 14; Winokur, supra note 175.
195. See Eidsmoe & Edwards, supra note 78, at 926; 43 AM. JUR. Trials § 24
(1991).
196. Eidsmoe & Edwards, supra note 78, at 923-24. The Insurance Services
Office's CISO's") boilerplate exclusion language for use in homeowners policies states
that "[t]here is no liability coverage for bodily injury that 'arises out of the transmission
of a communicable disease by an insured."' Eidsmoe & Edwards, supra note 78, at 927
(quoting the CommunicableDisease Exclusion Endorsement fromthe ISO's homeowners
policy). In addition to or in lieu of this exclusion, some insurers have adopted their own
versions of such an exclusion, and labeled them the "Sexually Transmitted Disease
Exclusion" or the "Sexual Contact Exclusion." Eidsmoe & Edwards, supra note 78, at
930-32.
197. Eidsmoe & Edwards, supra note 78, at 933-41.
198. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INsURANCE LAW § 63, at 383-84 (2d
ed. 1996). There is authority for the proposition that intent to transmit an STD, such as
herpes, "[can] be inferred as a matter of law" where "the insured knew or should have
known that he had herpes and could transmit it through unprotected sex. . . ." Id. § 63C,
at 408 (citing R.W. v. T.P., 528 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. 1995)). The insured's mere
"awareness ofa substantial probability ofharm [would be] enough to render the resulting
injury 'intentional."' Id. However, there is also authority to the contrary. Id. (citing State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1993)).
199. JERRY, supra note 198, § 63C, at 408.
200. See Eidsmoe & Edwards, supra note 78, at 939-41.
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tortioustransmissionjudgments and settlements. 1 These consequences-whether
they flow from the fact that the defendant is judgment proof or from the fact that
liabilityinsurance exists but excludes coverage-are directly contrary to the goals
of recognizing claims for wrongful transmission-or any other tort.
VI. CONCLUSION
Through its decision inDeuschle v. Jobe, the Missouri Court of Appeals of
the Western District of Missouri has added Missouri to the ranks of a growing
number of jurisdictions that recognize negligence and intentional tort claims
brought by unmarried partners for the wrongful transmission of herpes and HPV.
The Deuschle opinion, however, does not make recovery a sure thing for those
unwittingly infected with herpes or HPV. Before this outcome is achieved,
numerous changes inthe legislative, medical evidence, insurance, and socialnorm
landscapes must occur. Nevertheless, Missouri victims of tortious transmission
at least have an opportunity to right a wrong through legal channels.
MICHELE L. MEE
201. See, e.g., R.W. v. T.F., 528 N.W.2d 869, 873 (vfinm. 1995) (holding that
"[w]erefuse to promote the abdication of personal responsibility byproviding insurance
coverage when an insured engages in unprotected sexual intercourse despite having
knowledge that he is infected with herpes, a highly contagious and serious sexually
transmitted disease"). But see, e.g., Milbank Ins. Co. v. B.L.G., 484 N.W.2d 52, 58
(Minn. Ct App. 1992) (holding, inpertinent part, that "[c]overage is not avoided by an
intentional act exclusion unless the insuredhas actedwithintentto cause abodilyinjury[,
and w]hen the act.. . is intended but the resulting injury is not, the insurance exclusion
has no application); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 377 (rex.
1993) (finding that "[a]n insured under [an insurance] policy with an intentional injury
exclusion still relies on the policy to provide indemnity against fortuitous, unexpected or
undesignedinjyur);Loveridgev. Chartier, 468N.W.2d 146,157 (Vris. 1991) (reasoning
that "the existence of insurance coverage does not necessarily promote the abdication of




Mekel: Mekel: Kiss and Tell:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss4/7
